The name means “Gate of Tears” in Arabic, a reference either to the dangers of navigation or to an ancient earthquake that separated Africa from Arabia and drowned those caught between. At its narrowest point, Bab el-Mandeb measures just 26 kilometers across, divided by the island of Perim into two channels. Through this constriction passes all maritime traffic between the suez-canal and the Indian Ocean—a flow that includes roughly 10% of global seaborne trade and significant volumes of oil and liquefied natural gas bound for European markets.
Geographic Position¶
Bab el-Mandeb lies at the southern terminus of the Red Sea, where the coasts of Yemen and Djibouti approach within sight of each other. The strait connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden, which opens into the Arabian Sea and, beyond, the Indian Ocean.
The two channels:
- The eastern channel (Bab Iskender), between the Arabian coast and Perim Island, is narrow and shallow—approximately 3 kilometers wide and 30 meters deep
- The western channel, between Perim and the African shore, is wider and deeper, carrying the bulk of commercial traffic
The island of Perim, controlled by Yemen, sits in the middle of the strait and has been fortified by various powers throughout history.
Surrounding territories:
- Yemen controls the eastern shore and Perim Island
- Djibouti controls the western shore
- Eritrea lies to the north along the African coast of the Red Sea
- Somalia (including the self-declared state of Somaliland) lies to the south along the Gulf of Aden
This geography places the strait at the intersection of some of the world’s most fragile and conflict-prone states.
The Red Sea Corridor¶
Bab el-Mandeb’s strategic significance derives from its position as the southern gate to the Red Sea corridor—the maritime passage connecting the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean via the suez-canal.
Any vessel transiting from Asia to Europe through Suez must first pass through Bab el-Mandeb. The same applies in reverse. This creates a linear vulnerability: closure or disruption at any point along the corridor—Suez, the Red Sea, or Bab el-Mandeb—severs the entire route.
Traffic volumes:
- Approximately 20,000 vessels transit annually
- Roughly 6-7 million barrels of oil per day (primarily northbound to Europe)
- Significant LNG shipments from Qatar and other Gulf producers
- Container traffic between Asian manufacturing centers and European markets
The alternative—sailing around the Cape of Good Hope—adds approximately 7,000 kilometers and 10-14 days to voyages between the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean. When Bab el-Mandeb becomes dangerous, shipping costs rise and supply chains suffer.
Energy Transit¶
For European energy security, Bab el-Mandeb serves as the secondary chokepoint after the strait-of-hormuz. Oil loaded at Gulf terminals passes through Hormuz, traverses the Arabian Sea, enters the Gulf of Aden, and then must navigate Bab el-Mandeb to reach the Red Sea and ultimately the Mediterranean via Suez.
Northbound flows:
- Persian Gulf crude oil destined for European refineries
- Qatari and Emirati LNG shipments to Europe
- Refined petroleum products from Gulf processing facilities
Southbound flows:
- Empty tankers returning to Gulf loading terminals
- European exports to Asia
- Military vessels transiting between the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean
The interdependence of Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb, and Suez means that threats to any single chokepoint affect the entire system. An adversary capable of disrupting Bab el-Mandeb gains leverage over European energy supplies even without reaching the Persian Gulf itself.
The Yemen Conflict and Houthi Threats¶
Since 2015, Yemen has been consumed by civil war. The Houthi movement—officially Ansar Allah—seized the capital Sanaa and much of northern Yemen, prompting military intervention by a Saudi-led coalition. The conflict has produced a humanitarian catastrophe and transformed the country into a arena of middle-east regional rivalry, with Iran supporting the Houthis and Saudi Arabia backing the internationally recognized government.
Implications for Bab el-Mandeb:
The Houthis control territory along Yemen’s Red Sea coast, giving them the ability to threaten shipping in both the southern Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb itself.
Houthi capabilities include:
- Anti-ship cruise missiles (supplied by Iran)
- Naval mines
- Explosive-laden drone boats
- Armed drones capable of striking vessels
Demonstrated attacks:
The Houthis have repeatedly demonstrated willingness to attack commercial and military vessels:
- 2016: Attack on the UAE vessel HSV-2 Swift with an anti-ship missile
- 2016: Missiles fired at US Navy vessels in the Red Sea
- 2017-present: Multiple attacks on commercial shipping
- 2023-2024: Intensified campaign against vessels perceived as linked to Israel, following the Gaza conflict
These attacks have forced some shipping companies to reroute vessels around the Cape of Good Hope, accepting the longer voyage to avoid the risk. Insurance premiums for Red Sea transit have spiked during periods of Houthi activity.
The Iranian dimension:
Iran’s support for the Houthis extends its strategic reach to a second critical chokepoint. Tehran already possesses the ability to threaten the strait-of-hormuz; Houthi capabilities at Bab el-Mandeb provide an additional pressure point against Western interests without requiring direct Iranian action.
This represents a form of gray-zone-conflict—attacks that fall below the threshold of conventional war but impose real costs on adversaries.
Military Presence: Djibouti as Strategic Hub¶
Djibouti, on the African shore of Bab el-Mandeb, has leveraged its geography to become one of the most militarized small states on earth. Multiple great powers maintain bases in this nation of fewer than one million people.
Foreign military installations:
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United States: Camp Lemonnier, the only permanent US military base in Africa, hosts approximately 4,000 personnel. It serves as the headquarters for Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa and supports counterterrorism operations across the region.
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France: France maintains its largest military presence in Africa at Djibouti, reflecting colonial history (Djibouti was French Somaliland until 1977) and ongoing strategic interests.
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China: In 2017, China opened its first overseas military base in Djibouti, marking a significant expansion of Chinese military presence beyond the Western Pacific. The base can accommodate naval vessels and provides logistics support for Chinese operations in the Indian Ocean.
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Japan: Japan maintains a base supporting its anti-piracy mission in the Gulf of Aden—its first overseas military facility since World War II.
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Italy: Italy operates a military base supporting its naval presence in the region.
This concentration reflects Djibouti’s unique position: it offers access to Bab el-Mandeb, proximity to the Arabian Peninsula, and a staging point for operations in East Africa, Yemen, and the broader Indian Ocean.
For Djibouti, hosting foreign bases provides the revenue and security guarantees that sustain the government. For the foreign powers, the bases provide presence at a critical chokepoint and the ability to project power into adjacent regions.
Piracy and Maritime Security¶
The waters around Bab el-Mandeb have historically been plagued by piracy, particularly emanating from Somalia. Somali piracy peaked between 2008 and 2012, when pirates operating from the lawless Somali coast attacked hundreds of vessels in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean.
International response:
The piracy crisis prompted an unprecedented multilateral naval response:
- EU Naval Force (Operation Atalanta)
- Combined Maritime Forces (US-led coalition including CTF-151)
- NATO operations
- Independent deployments by China, Russia, India, Japan, and others
Naval patrols, armed guards on commercial vessels, and improved coordination dramatically reduced successful hijackings. By 2013, the immediate crisis had passed.
Residual risks:
Piracy has declined but not disappeared. The underlying conditions that produced Somali piracy—state collapse, poverty, opportunity—persist. Any reduction in naval presence could allow resurgence.
Additionally, the chaos in Yemen has raised concerns about Yemeni-based maritime crime, though this has not materialized at the scale of Somali piracy.
Strategic Assessment¶
Bab el-Mandeb illustrates several geopolitical principles.
Chokepoint vulnerability: Like the strait-of-hormuz and suez-canal, Bab el-Mandeb demonstrates how geography concentrates strategic importance. The global economy depends on a handful of narrow passages; those who can threaten these passages possess leverage disproportionate to their conventional military power.
Asymmetric threats: The Houthi example shows how non-state actors or weak states, armed with relatively inexpensive missiles and drones, can threaten sophisticated commercial and military vessels. The cost asymmetry favors the attacker: a missile costing thousands of dollars can threaten a ship worth hundreds of millions.
Extended deterrence: The US and allied military presence around Bab el-Mandeb exists primarily to deter attacks on commercial shipping—extended deterrence protecting the global commons rather than specific national territory.
Great power competition: The concentration of military bases in Djibouti reflects the broader pattern of US-China competition extending into new regions. Bab el-Mandeb is now a point of contact between American and Chinese military forces, with implications for both cooperation and potential friction.
Future Considerations¶
Several factors will shape Bab el-Mandeb’s future significance.
Yemen’s trajectory: Resolution of the Yemen conflict would reduce the most immediate threat to the strait. Continued war, particularly if it further empowers the Houthis or draws in external powers more directly, will perpetuate the danger.
Iranian strategy: Tehran’s approach to the Houthis and to Red Sea shipping more broadly reflects its regional strategy. Accommodation with Saudi Arabia and the West could reduce tensions; confrontation would likely increase attacks.
Energy transition: As global energy consumption shifts away from oil, the volume of tanker traffic through Bab el-Mandeb will eventually decline. However, container traffic—the other major category of shipping—will likely continue growing with global trade.
Climate and migration: The Horn of Africa faces severe climate stress, which could exacerbate instability in the states surrounding Bab el-Mandeb. Climate-driven migration and conflict could create new security challenges.
Conclusion¶
Bab el-Mandeb is the overlooked chokepoint. It lacks the name recognition of the suez-canal or the oil concentration of the strait-of-hormuz, yet it is integral to both. Every barrel of oil and every container moving between Europe and Asia through the Suez corridor must transit the Gate of Tears.
The strait’s position—bounded by Yemen’s civil war, proximate to Somalia’s chronic instability, and increasingly embedded in great power competition—makes it a persistent source of risk. The Houthi attacks of recent years have demonstrated that risk in practice, forcing shipping companies to choose between danger and delay.
For students of geopolitics, Bab el-Mandeb offers a concentrated lesson in how geography, conflict, and commerce intersect. A body of water barely 26 kilometers wide shapes the flow of global trade and commands the attention of the world’s major powers. The ancient name endures for good reason: the Gate of Tears has brought grief to many who sought to pass through, and the dangers it poses are far from historical.